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It should be emphasized that when confronted with an obstinate, obdurate and 
unregenerate defendant, a more detailed remedy is needed ... when a defendant exhibits a 
stubborn and perverse resistance to change, extensive court-ordered relief is both 
necessary and proper.1
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Consider a prison where prisoners are bound with “fetal” restraints,2 chained to toilets,3
and locked naked in outdoor cages.4 A prison in which inmate bones are broken,5 their skulls are 
 
1 Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, Address at the George Washington 
University National Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (Judge Justice was one of 
the Texas District Court judges involved in lengthy and ongoing litigation over unconstitutional state prison 
conditions in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
2Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing fetal restraint protocol as “handcuffing an 
inmate’s hands at the front of his body, placing him in leg irons, and then drawing a chain between the handcuffs 
and legs until only a few inches separate the bound wrists and ankles”). 
3 Id. at 1169. 
4 Id. at 1171. 
5 Id. at 1165 (detailing a guard applying enormous force to break a prisoner’s arm in order to inflict pain rather than 
assert control); id. at 1163 (observing that a correctional officer repeatedly punched an inmate until blood started 
shooting out of the inmate’s mouth resulting in a fractured jaw). 
2lacerated,6 and where they are bathed in boiling water until their skin peels off.7 A prison where 
inmates are extracted from their cells with shotguns that fire rubber blocks, tasers, batons, and 
mace.8 A place where a “code of silence” reigns9 and administrative authorities regularly turn a 
blind eye to the ritualized infliction of pain by prison guards.10 A place where guidelines about 
the use of firearms or lethal force are routinely violated11 and where no warning shots are 
permitted – guards must shoot to injure if confronted with violence.12 
The prison is neither Abu Ghraib nor Guantanomo Bay, but rather Pelican Bay State 
Prison, located in northwest California.13 In 1990, just one year after the prison opened, a class of 
prisoners confined in Pelican Bay Prison’s Secure Housing Unit (SHU) brought suit under the 
federal Civil Rights Act of 187114 challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of their 
confinement in Madrid v. Gomez.15 At the conclusion of the trial, after more than fifty-seven 
witnesses had testified, and more than six-thousand exhibits had been entered into evidence,16 
Judge Thelton Henderson appointed a Special Master to monitor prison conditions at Pelican 
Bay and to work with plaintiffs and defendants to develop a remedial plan addressing numerous 
Constitutional violations.17 The court would retain jurisdiction over conditions of confinement at 
Pelican Bay Prison until “all Constitutional violations found [through the litigation] have been 
 
6 Id. at 1162 (describing the first of many factual scenarios in a section entitled “Staff Assaults on Inmates”). 
7 Id. at 1166-67. 
8 Id. at 1172-78 (noting that cell extractions are viewed as “opportunities to punish, and inflict pain upon, the inmate 
population for what were often minor rules violations”). 
9 Id. at 1164. 
10 Id. at 1177 (quoting Charles Fenton, former warden of the federal super-maximum prison Marion Penitentiary and 
witness for the plaintiffs). This was the only case in which Warden Fenton testified on behalf of an inmate class. Id.
11 Id. at 1179. 
12 Id. at 1184 (quoting Pelican Bay Prison Associate Warden Garcia). 
13 Id. at 1155. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
15 889 F. Supp. at 1155. 
16 Id. at 1156. 
17 Id. at 1282-83. 
3fully and effectively remedied.”18 As of May 2005, more than eleven years after the trial began, 
the court continued to maintain jurisdiction.19 
Judge Henderson uncovered the horrific abuse20 in Pelican Bay’s SHU during an active 
fact-finding process. Before the trial commenced, Judge Henderson spent two days touring 
Pelican Bay.21 He also maintained an active role supervising and approving the implementation 
of the remedy – eventually threatening a federal court takeover of the California Department of 
Corrections to correct systemic problems, including the undue influence and abuse of power by 
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).22 
Critics of the type of judicial intervention undertaken by Judge Henderson decry such 
federal court actions as "activist" and outside the realm of legitimate judicial decision-making.23 
Such criticisms in the context of prison reform led to the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PLRA), which limited the power of federal courts to intervene in state prison 
systems.24 The PLRA was promulgated as a solution to the perceived problems of runaway 
prisoner litigation and abuse of federal court power25 and the Act’s proponents sought to leave 
the reform of state prisons to state political processes.26 However, Congress passed the PLRA on 
 
18 Id. at 1283. 
19 Madrid v. Woodford, No. C90-3094-T.E.H., Order Re (1) Special Master's Report Re "Post Powers" 
Investigations and Employee Discipline, and (2) CCPOA's Motion to Intervene (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2004). 
20 See notes 2-12, 223 and accompanying text. 
21 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
22 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
23 The critique of federal courts as activist has been levied by both liberals and conservatives, see Michael C. Dorf, 
After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247-1248 (2004) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003); compare Honorable William Rehnquist, Decisions Shouldn’t Lead to Judges 
Impeachments, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 2005 at B5 (defending judicial independence and articulating the view 
that the framers of the Constitution wanted to protect judicial independence and that judicial decisionmaking should 
not be swayed by popular opinion); but see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS  1-13 (1998). 
24 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
25 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
26 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2003) (indicating that the PLRA was 
driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with “imperial” or activist judging). 
4mistaken assumptions about the nature of prisoner litigation27 and improvidently eliminated 
enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure the Constitutionality of state prison policies.28 
By limiting federal court power to hear prisoner cases, Congress ensured an upsurge in 
Constitutional violations of individual prisoner rights.29 Indeed, prisoner abuse claims have risen 
since the passage of the PLRA as the political power of prison authorities and guards has grown 
and their control of state prison systems has been consolidated.30 Prisoners are increasingly shut 
out of the political process, especially in states that disenfranchise and otherwise hinder the 
social participation of convicted felons.31 This lack of political power guarantees that 
majoritarian political processes remain an ineffective prisoner rights enforcement mechanism.32 
A comparison of the critique of federal judges as activist and the assumptions underlying the 
PLRA with the facts and results of the Pelican Bay litigation will show that such critiques of 
federal court power are misguided and that federal judicial intervention is an effective and 
legitimate method of prison reform.33 
The 1960s and 1970s saw federal judicial intervention in state prisons peak when federal 
courts across the Southern states reformed state prison institutions, moving en masse from a 
“hands-off” policy to intervention based on the Eighth Amendment.34 Pelican Bay State Prison, 
and its numerous constitutional deficiencies, was a model case for federal court intervention.35 
27 Id. at 1692 (finding that although inmate suits outnumbered noninmate suits per capita in federal courts that once 
state case filings were included that the filing rates for both groups was very similar).  
28 See notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
29 ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA’S PRISONS 22-27, 32 (2004). 
30 Id. at 20-22. 
31 See id. at 206-07 (noting that ex-felons face other barriers such as exclusion from public assistance benefits, 
government housing, diminished employment prospects and exclusion from federal student loan programs). 
32 Id. at 32-33. 
33 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 50. 
34 Id. at 30-51. 
35 Cf. id. at 166-67. 
5However, Congressional passage of the PLRA36 limited federal court power to intervene in state 
prisons through structural reform litigation, wrongly assuming that the need for such intervention 
was over.37 Thus, as demonstrated by Madrid 38 and the California prison crises of the last 
decade,39 judicial intervention remains the only viable tool to remedy Constitutional deficiencies 
in state prisons, because majoritarian political processes fail to produce serious reform.40 
Comparing the type of federal court intervention with the ensuing state prison reform provides 
evidence of a nexus between intervention and reform:  the broader and more intrusive the threat 
of judicial action, the more quickly state officials implement reform.41 
For example, since Madrid was decided in 1995, the California prison system has 
received increased judicial scrutiny as the result of lawsuits brought on behalf of California 
prisoners by the Prison Law Office, a public interest law firm located in San Quentin, 
California.42 However, until 2004, when Judge Henderson threatened to place the entire state 
prison system under the supervision of the federal court,43 state elected officials were unwilling 
to act.44 Only since 2004 have the legislature and the governor seriously proposed or enacted 
 
36 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, 10 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 
and 28 U.S.C. 1932 (1996)). 
37 See notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
38 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
39 Id. at 1169; see discussion infra Part III.A. 
40 See discussion infra Part III.A 
41 E.g., FEELEY, supra note 23, 73 (quoting an Arkansas state official as saying the state would do “whatever it takes 
to get out from under” federal court supervision). 
42 The Prison Law Office, located in San Quentin California, has successfully challenged the constitutionality of 
prison conditions in a number of contexts including general prison conditions, excessive force, medical care, mental 
health care, and parole revocation proceedings. A description of the office and a list of its cases are available at 
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ (last visited 03/13/2005). 
43 See, e.g., Jenifer Warren, Takeover of State Prisons Is Threatened; a Federal Judge Assails the Schwarzenegger 
Administration on Lack of Reform, its Deal with Guards, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A1. 
44 Inaction by state officials in California is partly attributable to the influence of the California Correctional Peace 
Officers Association (CCPOA), see discussion infra Part III.A; see e.g., Franklin Zimring, California Commentary; 
A Gulag Mentality in the Prisons; A Burgeoning Population and Powerful Guard Union Allowed Prisons Like 
Corcoran to Slip Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at B9; Mark Martin, Guards Union Corrupts Prisons 
Report Finds, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 2004, at A1. 
6nascent prison reforms.45 Although there are other reasons, including legislative term limits and 
the 2003 recall election,46 that help to explain the recent shift towards prison reform, federal 
judicial intervention has been a necessary catalyst for institutional change in California’s 
prisons.47 
This Article examines Madrid, the last case before the passage of the PLRA in which a 
federal court broadly intervened in a state prison system through structural reform litigation.48 
Part II outlines the historical and jurisprudential foundations that legitimate federal judicial 
intervention in state prisons. Part III examines the California prison system through the lens of 
the Madrid litigation49 and the ongoing social and political problems caused by the prison crisis.  
Part IV concludes that judicial intervention remains the only viable tool to remedy constitutional 
deficiencies in state prisons when majoritarian political processes fail to produce serious 
reform.50 Therefore, it is essential that the power and independence of the federal judiciary be 
preserved to ensure the rights of the politically powerless and mitigate Constitutional harms. 
II.  CORRECTIONAL REFORM 
In a significant speech to the American Bar Association in 2003, Supreme Court Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy implored members of the Bar to pay more attention to the problems of the 
nation’s prison systems.51 He noted that one goal of the nation’s current correctional systems is 
to “degrade and demean the prisoner” and that this goal is unacceptable in “a society founded on 
 
45 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Madrid may be last serious, ongoing vindication of prisoner’s Constitutional rights in light of the passage of 
federal legislation designed to curb prisoner complaints and limit federal court power. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
49 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
50 A note about the scope of this endeavor: given the fluid and ongoing situation in the California correctional crisis, 
this study limits itself to the situation as it stood in early 2005. 
51 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Keynote Address at the American Bar Association Annual 
Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html [hereinafter Kennedy Speech] 
(on file with author). 
7respect for the inalienable rights of the people” – individual Constitutional rights do not end with 
incarceration.52 He further called on civil lawyers who “have expertise in coordinating groups, 
finding evidence, and influencing government policies” to take up the cause of prison reform 
because such lawyers “have great potential to help find more just solutions and more humane 
policies” for incarcerated individuals.53 
Certainly, many public lawyers have struggled to do as Justice Kennedy proposed:  to 
ensure the individual Constitutional rights of prisoners through various reform efforts including 
litigation.54 Prison litigation has forced federal courts to move from a “hands-off” approach 
toward a more interventionist posture regarding prison cases.55 However, assessing the impact 
that litigation has on prison systems is difficult because of the complexity of forces operating to 
influence any correctional system.56 At the least the shift towards judicial intervention has 
resulted in measurable positive changes in state correctional institutions, including the 
understanding and internalization of Constitutional standards by correctional officials,57 the 
development of bureaucratic policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with these 
standards,58 and finally, increased political and public visibility and awareness of conditions 
within correctional institutions.59 
A. The History and Evolution of Prison Reform 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Susan Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639, 691 (1993) (observing 
that hundreds of cases have been “brought and won by lawyers on behalf of inmates challenging the conditions and 
practices of our nations” correctional institutions). 
55 See id. at 659; but see FEELEY, supra note 23, at 39-46 (noting that there were hundreds of civil rights prison cases 
brought prior to 1965 before the federal courts began to take them seriously and that the federal courts shifted from 
civil rights jurisprudence to an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence thus enabling significant reform litigation to 
emerge). 
56 Id. at 648. 
57 Sturm, supra note 54, at 662. 
58 Id. at 667. 
59 Id. at 669-70. 
8Prior to the eighteenth century, punishment operated on the body of the condemned 
through public torture, “a gloomy festival of punishment”60 designed to objectify the accused, 
demonstrate the state’s power to punish, and to deter crime.61 However, in the late eighteenth 
century the modern prison was born,62 and along with it, recurring calls for penal reform. 63 From 
the workhouses of England in the early eighteenth century to the Philadelphia model of the 
nineteenth century to Bentham’s Panopticon,64 expressions of penal power have historically been 
accompanied by internal and external proposals for reform designed to better discipline and 
rehabilitate prisoners and to humanize the prison institution.65 
This change in penal theory, from public punishment to institutional rehabilitation, 
mirrored the evolution of the twentieth century welfare state.66 However, the last quarter century 
has seen a swing in the other direction: political rhetoric has shifted from the aspirations of the 
social welfare state to a discourse of personal responsibility. Increased State power premised on 
crime control and punishment comprise the penal element of political emphasis on person 
responsibility.67 This shift in rhetoric, both a symptom and consequence of increased crime rates, 
 
60 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 8 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
61 Id. at 48-49. 
62 See id. at 16 (observing that there has been a “reduction in penal severity” in the period from 1775-1975 as 
prisons began to focus less on punishment of the body of the condemned and more on rehabilitation). 
63 Id. at 115 (describing the rapid growth of imprisonment as taking up almost the entire field of punishment).  
Foucault also traces the history of efforts both internal and external to reform the prison institution over time.  Id. at 
121-26. 
64 See id. at 205 (identifying the Panopticon as a manifestation of state power that has become a “figure of political 
technology” and assures surveillance of the subject whether in or out of prison). 
65 Id. at 94-98 (identifying six major rules that underlie the power to punish that should be adhered to in order to 
obtain maximum results both on the individual and society). 
66 Cf. Theodore Caplow & Jonathon Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, 26 CRIME AND 
JUST. 63, 70-71 (1999) (indicating that over the course of the New Deal and Great Society eras that rehabilitative 
imprisonment was “rationalized as a form of state benefit”). 
67 See id. at 70-71 (identifying three factors that underlie changes in U.S. prison population:  political culture, public 
policy, and institutional organizations).  The authors argue that this shift has set in motion a “Reflexivity of the 
Penal System” in which the power of prison industries and corrections employees grows as prison population 
increases through increases in the numbers of prosecutions and the increasing tendency of parole and probation 
officers to return people to prison.  Id. at 72-73.  Foucault also identified the danger of an increase in disciplinary 
mechanisms arguing that such mechanisms have a tendency to “swarm” and to emerge from the “closed fortresses 
9the “Just Say No” campaign and an ongoing drug war that resulted in a concurrent prison-
building boom,68 has resulted in broad acceptance of the notion that politicians must favor 
harsher punishments and tougher crime control measures to gain and maintain political power.69 
As political discourse and sentiment switched to one of crime-control, so did penal 
philosophy – from a model focused on rehabilitation and post-incarceration integration back into 
society toward a neo-classic punishment regime designed to punish the body,70 through extra-
legal methods including the use of excessive force, torture, and retaliation.71 As prisons became 
more hidden from public view,72 the possibility of these extra-legal means of punishment 
increased and State action further dehumanized “part of the family of humankind.”73 This 
dehumanization continued when prisoners were “re-integrated” into a society in which they are 
barred from full participation.74 
As society began to move from a penal regime focused on rehabilitation to one focused 
on punishment and control, federal courts responded by shifting toward a more interventionist, 
active posture.75 Federal judges mitigated national social trends toward prison-based physical 
punishment and torture, first by enforcing Constitutional norms in Southern prisons through the 
 
[prisons] in which they once functioned and to circulate in a ‘free’ state” in which discipline evolves into ever more 
flexible methods of state control.  FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 211. 
68 ELSNER, supra note 29, at 18-27. 
69 Caplow, supra note 66, at 70 (1999). 
70 Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 113 (noting the links between prisons and broader society – the notion of the 
punitive city).   
71 See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that the “Eighth Amendment’s 
restraint on using excessive force has been repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay); see notes 2-12, 223 and 
accompanying text. 
72 Pelican Bay is near the town of Crescent City, almost four hundred miles from San Francisco.  Id. at 1155. 
73 Kennedy Speech, supra note 51. 
74 See ELSNER, supra note 29, at 206-07 (noting that ex-felons face other barriers such as exclusion from public 
assistance benefits, government housing, diminished employment prospects and exclusion from federal student loan 
programs). 
75 See generally, FEELEY, supra note 23; see e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding 
the lack of medical care to be a willful and intentional violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); 
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (extending the holding to all conditions within the prisons; the 
conditions of confinement violated “any judicial definition of cruel and unusual punishment”); Newman v. 
Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (placing the entire state prison system into receivership after eight 
years of willful intransigence by an uncooperative defendant); see notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
10
creation of legal doctrine in order to create more “moral” prisons, and then by opening closed 
state prison systems where notions of rehabilitation had been discarded in favor of neo-classic 
forms of physical torture and control. 76 
Federal judges used special masters, experts, and other administrative means in order to 
make quasi-administrative decisions to reform prisons.77 In Judicial Policy Making and the 
Modern State,78 professors Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin argue that the prison cases of the 
1960s and 1970s were vital, among other reasons, to eliminate the last vestiges of Southern 
slavery by “imposing national standards on state institutions.”79 In order to achieve the reform of 
those prisons, federal district court judges used bureaucracy as a coordinating idea with which to 
reshape Southern prisons.80 This coordinating idea enabled courts to promulgate standards and 
policies to professionalize corrections regimes and enforce individual Constitutional rights.81 
Federal courts sought to impose a modern bureaucratic scheme of governance in archaic 
Southern state prisons.82 Regardless of methodology, courts sought to bring prisons in line with 
evolving standards of civil society by transforming Southern state prisons into institutions that 
adhered to national standards.83 In particular, the Southern prison cases fit nicely into that 
framework since arguably, the practices and conditions in Southern prisons were the last vestiges 
of feudal slave systems of the previous century.84 The imposition of Constitutional norms on 
 
76 Id. at 265 (arguing that the “moral prison” was one of the central “coordinating ideas” that explains why federal 
judges suddenly found prison cases to be justiciable within the Eighth Amendment). 
77 Id. at 305-11. 
78 FEELEY, supra note 23. 
79 Id. at 149. 
80 Id. at 271 (noting that bureaucratization of prison administration was a second such “coordinating idea”). 
81 Id. at 281. 
82 Id. at 271. 
83 Id. at 166-67. 
84 Id. at 151-57. 
11
state institutions fits into any framework of federal judicial action since judges are the final 
enforcers of the constitutional rights of individuals, incarcerated or not.85 
B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995  
Given that federal court intervention in state prisons successfully altered prison life for 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners,86 Congress acted to authorize the United States Attorney 
General to bring actions against state institutions, including prisons, to secure the Constitutional 
rights of individuals through passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 
(CRIPA).87 Although Section 1983 actions ensured access to federal courts and achieved 
substantial reforms of state prisons,88 CRIPA provided an additional avenue through which the 
federal government could intervene to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners.89 However, 
the United States rarely brought suit under the provisions of CRIPA, leaving Section 1983 
actions as the main vehicle for prison conditions and excessive force litigation.90 
Although federal judicial intervention remedied conditions of confinement in prisons 
across the United States, Congress limited judicial discretion in hearing such claims by enacting 
the PLRA.91 The PLRA was enacted in response to a perception among politicians that frivolous 
 
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 146-147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Andrew Hacker ed. 1964) (arguing that the federal 
judiciary must protect the Constitution and the rights of individuals and minorities from the majority). 
86 See notes 56-59, 75-80 and accompanying text. 
87 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997-1997i (1980)). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (2004). 
90 U.S. v. State of Mich., 62 F.3d 1418 (1995); U.S. v. State of Hawai’i, 564 F.Supp. 189 (D.Hawai'i, 1983); 
(initiating suit over prison conditions); U.S. v. Los Angeles County, 635 F.Supp. 588 (C.D. Cal., 1986) (initiating 
suit over conditions at juvenile hall).  However, CRIPA has most often been invoked to protect patients in mental 
health units and developmentally disabled living centers.  See e.g., U.S. v. Com. of Pa., 902 F.Supp. 565 (W.D. Pa., 
1995); U.S. v. State of Or., 839 F.2d 635 (1988) (initiating suits over conditions at state mental health facility); U.S. 
v. State of Tenn., 925 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Tenn., 1995); U.S. v. State of Conn., 931 F.Supp. 974 (D. Conn., 1996) 
(initiating suits against state institution for mentally retarded persons). 
91 Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, 10 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3626 and 28 U.S.C. 1932, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996)). 
12
prisoner complaints were overloading federal court dockets.92 Political emphasis on the rhetoric 
of crime control and punishment drove the enactment of the PLRA.93 In the decade prior to the 
enactment of the PLRA, inmate filings in federal court increased during eight of the ten years to 
a maximum of 40,000 cases filed in 1995.94 But a comparison of inmate filing rates and the 
overall filing rates of the general population showed that inmates were no more litigious than the 
general population.95 In introducing the Act, Senator Orrin Hatch, then chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, stated the legislation would “bring relief to a civil justice system 
overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits” and help “slam shut the revolving door on the 
prison gate and to put the key safely out of the reach of overzealous federal courts.”96 
Specifically, the PLRA limited prisoner access to federal courts through the amendment 
of a provision of CRIPA.97 Previously, a district court had discretion to continue a case in order 
to require the prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before the case could go forward in 
federal court.98 In contrast, the PLRA mandates that a prisoner must exhaust administrative 
remedies prior to the commencement of litigation in federal court.99 Requiring prisoners to 
exhaust all administrative remedies means that most prisoner suits will never reach federal courts 
for two reasons: first, most prisoners proceed pro se100 and second, the exhaustion requirement 
 
92 Ann H. Mathews, Note:  The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive 
Force, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 536, 538 (2002). 
93 See id. at 1559 (indicating that the PLRA was driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with “imperial” or 
activist judging). 
94 Schlanger, supra note 26, at 1558 (noting that inmate litigation took up nineteen percent of the federal civil docket 
and that fifteen percent of federal civil trials were civil rights cases brought by inmates).   
95 Id. at 1692 (finding that although inmate suits outnumbered noninmate suits per capita in federal courts that once 
state case filings were included that the filing rates for both groups was very similar).  
96 Id. at 1565 (2003) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch in 141 Cong. Rec. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)). 
97 42 U.S.C. 1997e (2004). 
98 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 § 7 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1980)). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2004). 
100 David M. Adlerstein, Note:  In Need of Correction:  The “Iron Triangle” of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1690 (2001) (noting that “a full ninety-six percent of prisoner Section 1983 suits are 
brought pro se, and that eighty-two percent of prisoners are high school dropouts”). 
13
exposes prisoners to retaliation by prison authorities chilling the possibility of future prison 
reform through Section 1983 actions.101 
Many commentators have criticized the PLRA as an unnecessary intrusion into the 
discretion and inherent powers of federal court judges.102 In addition to removing judicial 
discretion concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Act limits the remedies 
available in prisoner civil rights lawsuits.103 The Act also restricts prospective injunctive relief 
through a tripartite need, narrowness, and intrusiveness requirement:104 the relief must be 
“narrowly drawn” to extend “no further than necessary to correct the violation” and must be the 
“least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal right.”105 
The Act further requires that federal judges limit preliminary injunctive relief to no more 
than ninety days,106 limits the types of prophylactic remedies that may be imposed,107 and sets 
time limits on the relief,108 requiring that a court may extend prospective relief only by written 
findings that prospective relief remains necessary and that such relief is the least intrusive relief 
possible to correct the federal right.109 In practice, the needs, narrowness, and intrusiveness 
criteria for prophylactic injunctive relief, coupled with automatic termination provisions, mean 
that extensive federal intervention in state prisons is a thing of the past.110 The Pelican Bay 
 
101 Mathews, supra note 92, at 555. 
102 See generally William B. Mack III, Justice for Some:  Excessive Force Claims after Porter v. Nussle, 36 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265 (2003); Mathews, supra note 92; Adlerstein, supra note 100. 
103 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2004). 
104 Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
105 Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
106 Id. at § 3626(a)(2) (2004). 
107 Id. at § 3626(a)(3) (2004). 
108 Id. at § 3626(b) (2004). 
109 Id. at § 3626(b)(3) (2004). 
110 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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Prison case may be last instance where a federal district court has exercised its equitable 
discretion to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners over an extended period.111 
Most critiques of federal court intervention in state prisons misapprehend the problem of 
power by focusing on the alleged misuse of federal court power rather than the misuse of power 
by prison guards and administrators.112 Judge Henderson’s supervision of Pelican Bay undercuts 
the crime control rhetoric that drove passage of the PLRA and the arguments of those who 
criticize federal judges as activist.113 Federal courts in these cases match state power that violates 
Constitutional norms with federal power only to the extent necessary to end Constitutional 
violations.114 
The power of the CCPOA within state government and a resistance to change within the 
California Department of Corrections (CDC) are recurring themes in the legal texts of the 
Pelican Bay case and are real political forces to be reckoned with in attempted reform of the 
California correctional system.115 Judge Henderson used the limited power of the district court to 
publicize the conditions of confinement of California prisoners, to expose entrenched power 
structures resistant to change, to professionalize the CDC, and ultimately, to use federal court 
power to transform California’s prison system from a system where power destroys 
Constitutional rights into a system that honors those guarantees.116 
111 Id. 
112 John Yoo, Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Remedies:  Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent 
Remedial Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (criticizing federal court involvement in 
structural reform litigation). 
113 See notes 117-118. 
114 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1311 (1976). 
115 See generally Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), enforced sub nom Madrid v. Woodford, 
No. C90-3094-T.E.H., Special Master’s Final Report Re Department of Corrections Post Powers Investigation and 
Employee Discipline (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2004). 
116 See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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C. Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention 
Lately, attacks on so-called activist judges have increased as concerns about federal 
judicial power have regained currency in lockstep with the resurgence of federalist ideology and 
power.117 Critics from both the left and the right have characterized judicial activism as anti-
democratic and anti-majoritarian, arguing that judges must interpret, rather than make, the law.118 
Past decisions that compelled broad institutional or social reforms, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education,119 were particularly criticized at the time they were rendered.120 However, judicial 
intervention in state prison systems during the remedial stage of litigation often spurred state 
elected officials to act, suggesting that, at least in the context of prison reform litigation, such 
criticism of judicial intervention is flawed.121 
Judges, particularly Article III judges, are in a unique position to encourage broad 
institutional reform. Despite criticism that wide-ranging judicial intervention is anti-democratic 
or counter-majoritarian,122 the framers envisioned judicial advancement of unpopular positions 
as the final protection of the Constitutional rights of minority groups.123 Because federal judges 
 
117 See generally John Yoo, Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Remedies:  Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? 
The Inherent Remedial Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (criticizing federal court 
involvement in structural reform litigation); Charlie LeDuff and Nick Madigan, The California Recall: The 
Candidates; New Twist Brings Anger from Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 16, 2003, at A1 (reporting former California 
GOP Chairman Shawn Steel’s critique of the reliance of the 9th Circuit panel on Bush v. Gore in delaying the 2003 
gubernatorial recall election); but see Chayes, supra note 114, at 1296-1311 (defending the role of the judge as an 
active fact finder and arguing that the public law litigation is particularly well suited to the nature of the federal 
judiciary). 
118 The critique of federal courts as activist has been levied by both liberals and conservatives, see Dorf, supra note 
23, at 1247-1248 (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)); compare U.S. Supreme 
Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Decisions Shouldn’t Lead to Judges Impeachments, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 
24, 2005 at B5 (defending judicial independence and articulating the view that the framers of the Constitution 
wanted to protect judicial independence and that judicial decisionmaking should not be swayed by popular opinion). 
119 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
120 See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
121 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
122 Alexander Bickel first described the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” in THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
123 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of 
the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain rights from the political arena and from majority control and declaring 
“[the Court] must not, in the guise of "judicial restraint," abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill 
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do not have to face the electorate and are insulated from political pressures they may act in ways 
that are politically unpopular in order to force needed reforms.124 Although it may be preferable 
for local political processes to take care of structural reforms, such changes often languish if not 
for federal judicial intervention, as elected officials have little incentive to act on behalf of 
politically unpopular minority groups.125 
In the context of prison reform, Professors Feeley and Rubin have attacked the social 
myths that delineate the proper role of the judge, most notably that judges should only interpret 
the law according to existing rules without considering the social results of those decisions.126 
They further argue that regardless of whether structural prison reform cases are viewed as policy 
making or Constitutional rights enforcement, such decisions are firmly within the powers of the 
federal judiciary.127 In analyzing judicial action, Feeley and Rubin define policy making as 
“officials exercis[ing] power on the basis of their judgment that their actions will produce 
socially desirable results,”128 which means that all judicial decision making is policy making.129 
Such interpretive and ongoing judicial decision-making and intervention in state prisons is a 
 
of Rights”); Stephen B. Bright, Speech: Political Attacks on the Judiciary:  Can Justice be Done Amid Efforts to 
Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 326 (1997) (quoting 
Justice Hugo Black describing the Constitutional role of the federal judiciary); RONALD WEICH, AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, UPSETTING CHECKS AND BALANCES: CONGRESSIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARD THE COURTS IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS, 11-17 (2001) available at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/courtstripping.pdf (on file with author). 
124 Bright, supra note 123, at 327-29 (noting that the Bill of Rights is “regularly denigrated in political discourse in 
the United States today as nothing more than a collection of technicalities.  Someone needs to step forward and 
remind everyone that the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights are fundamental principles”); WEICH, supra 
note 123, at 10-13. 
125 For example, one commentator argues the reason civil rights cases are mainly enforced by federal rather than 
state courts is that elected state court judges are not independent enough to protect the rights of unpopular 
minorities, see Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the South? Overcoming History, 
Elections and the Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998). 
126 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 13-17. 
127 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977); Tracy A. Thomas, 
The Prophylactic Remedy:  Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF.
L. REV. 301, 303-06 (2004); Chayes, supra note 114, at 1282-84. 
128 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that Ronald Dworkin, in LAW’S EMPIRE, criticized such action by judges) . 
129 Id. at 9. 
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slow process that, over time, results in Constitutional conditions of confinement and the 
professionalization of state correctional departments.130 
In the Pelican Bay litigation, Judge Henderson’s active role falls within a well-
established doctrinal framework of prison reform litigation and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.131 Judge Henderson used hermeneutic interpretation and mediation to work 
towards the creation of a more moral prison system by professionalizing the Pelican Bay Prison 
administration, and as the litigation proceeded, realizing that the problems uncovered in the 
implementation stage extended throughout the Department and merited a restructuring of the 
entire CDC through the use of federal court power.132 Many commentators have defended 
prophylactic relief as a legitimate adjudicatory function by federal court judges.133 But even 
given the positive results of prison reform litigation, the biggest problem in such litigation is the 
enforcement and implementation of court ordered remedies.134 
Given the difficulty of institutional change, there is no other effective check on 
“correctional institutions other than litigation or the threat of litigation.”135 The “institutional 
change model,” targeting “particular institutions or systems with illegal practices” offers the 
greatest promise in achieving prison reforms to ensure compliance with Constitutional 
standards.136 Additionally, the enforcement of remedies remains a problem, even when society 
 
130 Id. at 169-70. 
131 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
132 See infra Part III.D; see generally Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), enforced sub nom 
Madrid v. Woodford, No. C90-3094-T.E.H., Special Master’s Final Report Re Department of Corrections Post 
Powers Investigation and Employee Discipline 127 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2004). 
133 E.g., FEELEY, supra note 23; Thomas, supra note 127, at 303-06; Chayes, supra note 114, at 1282-84 (defending 
judicial action that is administrative, active, and ongoing and where fact-finding is done by non-adversarial methods 
including the use of special masters and outside experts). 
134 Sturm, supra note 54, at 673. 
135 Id. at 691. 
136 Susan Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates:  Organizational Structure and Corrections Advocacy, 27 U. Mich. 
J.L. Ref. 1, 10 (1993). 
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acknowledges prison failures.137 Bureaucratic institutions are notoriously difficult to change,138 
and prisons are no exception.139 Therefore, plaintiff’s counsel or federal courts,140 must oversee 
prisons, as political officials, because of high political costs, are unable to endorse or engage in 
substantive prison reform.141 Since state political processes will not protect the Constitutional 
rights of prisoners, federal judges must enforce Constitutional norms.142 
Although federal courts must enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners, “no one 
familiar with litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have been overeager to usurp the 
task of running prisons.”143 Rather, federal courts have stepped in when state officials and 
agencies have failed to enforce the Constitutional rights of prisoners and when Constitutional 
violations are so egregious as to constitute the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;” 
where “the soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions in American prisons has been thrust upon the 
judicial conscience” and became impossible to ignore.144 Faced with these continuing violations 
 
137 Id. at 36. 
138 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 300-01. 
139 See generally CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S YOUTH AND ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM, (June 2004) at http://www.report.cpr.ca.gov/corr/index.htm [hereinafter Deukmejian 
Report] (on file with author); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), enforced sub nom Madrid v. 
Woodford, No. C90-3094-T.E.H., Special Master’s Final Report Re Department of Corrections Post Powers 
Investigation and Employee Discipline (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2004). 
140 This is exactly the type of litigation described by Professor Abram Chayes in his seminal article, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra note 114, at 1284, as the vindication of Constitutional policies that “embod[y] 
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during the remedial phase of institutional change litigation as the judge oversees implementation of the judgment or 
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they undertake supervision of state administrative agencies.  See Charles Sabel & Theodore Simon, How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1017-19 (2004); but see generally FEELEY, supra note 23. 
141 Caplow, supra note 66, at 70-71; see discussion infra Part III.A.  
142 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of 
the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain rights from the political arena and from majority control and declaring 
“[the Court] must not, in the guise of "judicial restraint," abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill 
of Rights”) 
143 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
144 Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing inhumane conditions confronted by federal courts including 
vermin in living quarters and food, overcrowding, sexual assault by other inmates, brutality by prison guards, and 
rampant violence (citing these conditions from Judge Frank Johnson’s extensive factual findings in Pugh v. Locke, 
406 F.Supp. 318 (MD Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified, 559 F.2d 283 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 
U.S. 781 (1978)). 
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the Supreme Court has held that District Courts have broad remedial authority to address 
Constitutional violations and can modify earlier orders and direct more intrusive relief if such 
violations remain uncorrected after the initial order.145 However, the PLRA limited this power 
even though prison litigation transformed state prisons in the United States by mandating 
Constitutional norms.146 The chilling abuses outlined in Madrid, symptomatic of wider problems 
within the CDC, are strong evidence of why passage of the PLRA was a policy mistake.147 
III.  THE CALIFORNIA CRISIS 
Scandal,148 broken promises of systemic reform by prison officials, 149 and increased 
tensions between prison guards and prisoners as the prison population grew150 characterized 
California’s prison system between 1990 and 2005.151 During the same period, California 
politicians, while paying lip service to the notion of reform by creating committees and 
commissions to investigate the problems made no effective effort to implement systemic 
 
145 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977). 
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147 See notes 2-12, 223 and accompanying text. 
148 See e.g., Dan Morain, California’s Profusion of Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at A1 (detailing the 
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149 Mark Arax and Jenifer Warren, Despite State Promises, Reform Eludes Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at 
B1 (describing the resignation of then CDC Director Edward Alameida, known as “Easy Ed” for his acquiescence to 
the wishes of the CCPOA leadership and noting that the CDC “remains troubled by allegations that rogue guards 
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150 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE AND SOUND PAROLE POLICIES, Executive 
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151 Dan Morain, Era of Higher Tensions Seen at State Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at A1 (describing the 
interplay of a growing prison population due to the passage of the three-strikes law, longer prison terms, and the loss 
of inmate privileges and programs). 
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change.152 State elected officials abdicated their responsibility to oversee and control the 
California Department of Corrections to the CCPOA.153 The only effective efforts at reform –at 
Pelican Bay State Prison and Corcoran State Prison – were the result of intervention by the 
federal government.154 
A.    California’s Prison System and the CCPOA 
Vested political interests, including the CCPOA, have captured California’s political 
processes, thus federal court intervention remains the only effective mechanism to enforce the 
Constitutional rights of California’s prisoners.155 Michael Alpert, chair of California’s “Little 
Hoover” Commission,156 advocated a return to a rational rehabilitation system in California’s 
state prisons, noting that the practical goal of incarceration should be preventing recidivism157 
during testimony to the American Bar Association’s Justice Kennedy Commission.158 However, 
such proposals are antithetical to the CCPOA as substantial reforms could lead to fewer 
 
152 Arax, supra note 144 (noting repeated scandals in the department stemming from the same cause: a general lack 
of oversight by the legislative and executive branches coupled with untrammeled CCPOA influence and power 
within the CDC and political branches). 
153 Cf. Mark Gladstone and Mark Arax, Attorney General’s Office to Investigate 24 Shootings by Corcoran Prison 
Guards, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at A3 (describing the shifting blame between the CDC and the CCPOA 
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155 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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157 Testimony of Michael Alpert before the American Bar Association's Justice Kennedy Commission at McGeorge 
School of Law (April 15, 2004) (on file with author). 
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prisoners, fewer new prisons and prison guards, and a concurrent weakening in the political 
power of the union.159 
State Senator Gloria Romero, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on the California 
Correctional System and author of a number of bills introduced to reform the CDC during the 
2003-2004 legislative term, expressed concern about the CCPOA’s undue influence.160 Intense 
lobbying by the CCPOA killed most of Senator Romero’s bills, leading the Senator to declare 
that “justice took a walk” when SB 1731, which would have overturned a clause in the CCPOA’s 
contract which currently requires all information, including the accuser’s name, to be turned over 
to the guard under investigation prior to the commencement of the inquiry, was voted down.161 
CCPOA power is such that it only need remind a legislator of the political cost of appearing soft 
on crime and threaten to withhold political campaign contributions in the next election cycle in 
order to obtain cooperation.162 
The CCPOA has the most at stake in any attempted reform of California’s prison 
system.163 Because of this, the union has been the most resistant to any reform perceived as 
weakening the CCPOA’s control of the prison system.164 Inmate complaints about guard 
misconduct had to be disclosed to the guard in question prior to the initiation of any 
 
159 See notes 159-162 and accompanying text. 
160 Senator Romero Introduced six bills during the 2003-2004 legislative session designed to reform media access to 
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161 Jenifer Warren, Some Reforms Blocked, but Prison System Is Improving, Senator Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2004, at B6. 
162 Warren, supra note 161 (noting that the union warned lawmakers that a "yes" vote was fraught with peril). 
163 Susan Beck, Inside Story, THE RECORDER, May 14, 2001, at 1 (noting that the CCPOA has more than 28,000 
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164 State Net Ballot Book, November 2000 Ballot Initiatives -- Once More With Feeling?, CALIFORNIA JOURNAL,
Sept. 1, 2000 (noting CCPOA opposition to Proposition 36 which proscribed treatment rather than incarceration for 
first time drug offenders); See Harriet Chang, State to Revamp Parole System: Lawsuit Settlement Seeks to Reduce 
Inmate Population, S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 19, 2003, at A-1 (noting CCPOA opposition to any reform in the parole 
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22
investigation, and correctional officers have had little to fear from internal investigations.165 
This requirement has likely had a chilling effect on prisoner complaints, as retribution by guards 
is almost certain after a prisoner files a complaint.166 The recent creation of an independent 
Bureau of Review to investigate allegations of guard misconduct and excessive force threatens to 
make inroads on CCPOA power.167 Observers hope the Bureau will be able to undertake 
independent investigations of correctional officer wrongdoing free of the improper influence that 
has marked past investigations of correctional officer wrongdoing.168 Until recently, the political 
influence of the CCPOA has blocked this type of reform.169 
The politically connected union exercises the kind of “raw power and privilege” only 
possible in a society where criminal punishment is the prevailing political motif.170 The coercive 
power of the CCPOA in the halls of prisons and the state Capitol is troubling in a state that once 
pioneered a “national model for prison-based rehabilitation” under then Governor Earl 
Warren.171 In a critique of the current system, the Little Hoover Commission concluded that real 
change depended upon whether “California’s leaders have the will to make the policy choices 
based on evidence rather than ideology, on facts rather than fears.”172 Over the last two decades, 
California’s political leaders made policy choices based on ideology and political expedience 
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Attorney General Bill Lockyer after the CCPOA successfully killed a bill that would have given the California 
Attorney General’s Office jurisdiction to investigate prison guard and administration illegalities as saying state 
Assemblyman Jim Battin (R-La Quinta) told him “Sorry, but I’m whoring for the CCPOA.”). 
170 Warren, supra note 161 (quoting Senator Romero). 
171 Editorial, State Prison’s Revolving Door; Judge’s Last Chance Demand, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at B12. 
172 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE AND SOUND PAROLE POLICIES, at 84 (November 
2003) available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/172/report172.pdf [hereinafter LHC PAROLE REPORT] (on file with 
author). 
23
rather than the rule of law leaving federal courts to remedy Constitutional deficiencies and to 
push for real reform in California’s prisons.173 
B.   Federal Judicial Reform 
Pelican Bay State Prison’s Secure Housing Unit, the subject of Madrid v. Gomez, 174 was 
designed to better control the most dangerous prisoners within the California correctional 
system.175 CDC designed the SHU to house “the worst of the worst” and since prison authorities 
accept the syllogism that guards are only as violent as the inmates warrant, this has led to a host 
of Constitutional violations at Pelican Bay.176 
Because of his unique role as an Article III judge, Judge Thelton Henderson could begin 
the job of prison reform at Pelican Bay by undertaking an impartial evaluation of prisoner 
claims, and in doing so publicize their plight while maintaining the legitimacy of judicial 
intervention and upholding a core principle of the Eighth Amendment.177 Thus, Judge Henderson 
acted within a well-established doctrinal framework of federal judicial intervention in state 
prison systems established by earlier prison cases to vindicate the Constitutional rights of 
incarcerated prisoners at Pelican Bay.178 The relevant legal standard for Judge Henderson’s 
decision was the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against such punishment applies to 
conditions of incarceration – the Constitution “retains its ‘full force’ behind prison doors.”179 
173 See discussion infra III.D. 
174 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
175 Cf., FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 82. 
176 See notes 2-12, 223 and accompanying text. 
177 After 1995 the number of stories about prison cases and conditions in California rose dramatically in number.  
Prior to 1995 there were very few stories but after the Pelican Bay decision more than 1,000 stories are listed in the  
California Daily Newspapers between 1995 and 2004 according to Lexis-Nexis.  
178 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318 (MD Ala. 1976); FEELEY, supra 
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179 Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing Michenfelder v. Summer, 860 F.2d 328, 335 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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Prison administrators and guards must treat inmates as full human beings: “there is no place for 
abuse or mistreatment, even in the darkest of jailhouse cells.”180 Society punishes prisoners 
through incarceration, not by unnecessarily cruel treatment once jailed.181 
The Pelican Bay case differs from the Southern prison cases in several important 
respects. The Southern prison cases were important because prison reforms were the final step of 
the process of national re-integration begun with reconstruction.182 The judges in the Southern 
prison cases sought to impose national social values upon state prisons by requiring prison 
administration conformity to accepted bureaucratic patterns and practices183 resulting in more 
moral prisons.184 In contrast, the Pelican Bay case sought to restrain a runaway correctional 
system where the CCPOA, rather than agency directors and prison wardens, ran the CDC.185 
Where Southern prisons had little or no modern bureaucratic institutions to control guards 
and inmates, California’s CDC has both too much and too little bureaucracy.186 For example, 
there is too much bureaucracy in the prisoner classification and assignment process but far too 
little bureaucracy in providing adequate medical care to prisoners.187 Recently, the state admitted 
that prison medical care is a “broken system” and state officials warmed to the idea of a federal 
court takeover.188 Ideally, political processes should have modernized the bureaucracy within 
CDC to comply with modern administrative practices and procedures and prevent a recapture of 
the management system by the CCPOA.189 However, given that the political process had failed 
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punishment, not for punishment”). 
182 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 245.  
183 Id. at 151-57. 
184 Id. at 245. 
185 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
186 John O. Hagar, Lunch and Lecture at McGeorge School of Law (April 6, 2005) (on file with author). 
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to produce such reform and ensure accountability, the only effective way to reform the CDC was 
through federal court intervention.190 
1. The Eighth Amendment 
Over the last half-century, the United States Supreme Court has developed modern 
normative principles in the prison context to govern the previously non-justiciable “cruel and 
unusual punishment clause” of the Eighth Amendment.191 These principles have 
Constitutionalized the nature of state punishment and prison conditions and include the right to 
adequate medical care,192 the right to freedom from punitive or retaliatory physical force,193 and 
the right to freedom from confinement where the totality of prison conditions and practices are 
so bad that they are “shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people.”194 For two 
decades beginning in the mid 1960s the Court decided a number of prison condition cases that 
claimed Eighth Amendment violations.195 The Court developed flexible tests to determine 
whether a condition or practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, allowing or mandating 
federal court intervention in order to enforce the Constitution behind prison walls.196 The 
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United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved over the last half 
century, with an eye toward the evolving standards of civilized society.197 Prisons need not be 
comfortable places but neither may they deprive their inhabitants of basic Constitutional 
protections.198 Prisoner Constitutional rights include the right to the minimum necessities of life 
including “food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.”199 
In assessing claims of cruel and unusual punishment, courts must inquire into both 
objective and subjective factors.200 Generally, a prison official who acts reasonably cannot face 
liability under the Eighth Amendment.201 The objective component of the test for cruel and 
unusual punishment is an inquiry into the seriousness of the infliction of pain – the harm must be 
sufficiently serious in order to implicate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Constitution.202 The subjective component is an inquiry into prison officials’ state of mind to 
establish that the pain inflicted was “unnecessary and wanton.”203 The court determines the 
objective component as a matter of law while the subjective component is a question of fact 
satisfied through proof of deliberate indifference, a standard equivalent to proof of subjective 
recklessness in criminal cases.204 However, whenever a prisoner alleges excessive force against 
individual prison guards the standard of proof is higher; the prisoner must show more than 
deliberate indifference.205 The “core judicial inquiry [becomes] whether force was applied in a 
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good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.”206 
Judge Thelton Henderson characterized the question presented to the court in Madrid as 
whether or not the defendants “[had] a policy of permitting and condoning a pattern of excessive 
force and whether that policy is attributable to a culpable state of mind” rather than simply ruling 
on the validity of prison regulations ostensibly designed to restore order or the legality of any 
individual guard’s actions in regard to the use of excessive force.207 This characterization 
allowed the judge to apply the lower culpability standard: deliberate indifference rather than the 
more stringent malicious and sadistic standard.208 Further, this characterization also allowed the 
judge to find that defendant prison administration officials had not dealt with conspicuous 
Constitutional shortcomings in the operation of Pelican Bay Prison and that such deficiencies 
required extensive judicial supervision, mandating the appointment of a special master to aid 
prison authorities during the remedial stage of the litigation and to modernize the prison 
bureaucracy.209 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of excessive physical force “ha[d] been 
repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay ... [where the] force applied was so strikingly disproportionate 
to the circumstances” that it clearly contravened Constitutional norms.210 Further, the level of 
force was “open, acknowledged, tolerated, and sometimes expressly approved” by the prison 
administration, thus meeting the standard of “deliberate indifference.”211 In the words of one 
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expert, “I have never observed ... the level of officially sanctioned unnecessary and excessive 
force that exist[ed]” at Pelican Bay Prison.212 
2.  MADRID V. GOMEZ 
In Madrid, prisoners alleged a pattern of excessive force and sought to show that prison 
officials acted with deliberate indifference and malicious intent.213 The rise of the super-
maximum security prison214 over the last quarter-century has produced tension between the 
state’s desire to control the most dangerous of prisoners by transferring them to supermax 
facilities and the problems that come with concentrating the most egregious offenders in one 
facility215 rather than throughout a prison system. A “supermax” institution is always close to 
spiraling out of control as the level of violence between guards and inmates increases.216 
Proponents of supermax facilities characterize them as efficient, claiming that guards are only as 
violent as an inmate population warrants, justifying the use of maximum rather than minimum 
force in any given situation, and reinforcing perpetual instability and violence within prison 
walls.217 However, in denying excessive force problems, prison authorities enable the “code of 
silence” that prevents staff reporting of abuse of inmates to persist. 
Judge Henderson addressed the requirement of a moral prison that comported with 
Constitutional values using several techniques. First, Judge Henderson characterized the 
prisoner’s claim as a case about “fellow human beings -- most of whom will one day return to 
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society ... [who have] ‘human dignity.’”218 In restoring humanity to prisoners generally 
dehumanized by prison conditions and demonized by political rhetoric, Judge Henderson recast 
the issue as implicating both fundamental human rights and Constitutional violations. Second, 
Judge Henderson’s acknowledgement of a common human bond served to bridge the gap 
between those within and those without the prison’s walls while tacitly destabilizing accepted 
governmental structures, calling for renewed vigilance by the public, and critically re-examining 
the links between prison power and Constitutional values.219 Finally, Judge Henderson 
undertook a lengthy recitation of the facts, detailing numerous and egregious Constitutional 
violations over the course of eighty-nine pages of the Federal Supplement.220 The facts presented 
are so abysmal that only a few pages into the opinion it is clear that something had gone horribly 
wrong at Pelican Bay and perhaps throughout the CDC.221 
The judicial text opened a previously closed system in which secrecy, autonomy, and 
total power by guards over prisoners facilitated persecution through corporal punishment and 
violent retaliation rather than discipline and rehabilitation.222 Prisoners have greater value than 
as objects for the exercise of state power: “the ‘mind’ [is more than] a surface of inscription for 
power” and the body as the device through which that power is inscribed.223 The language of the 
opinion underscored the seriousness of the Constitutional violations and the importance of the 
recognition that prisoners are part of the polity; prisoners, although temporarily removed from 
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society by the state, are eventually returned to civilization and must be viewed and treated as part 
of society.224 
In evaluating conditions within the SHU Judge Henderson noted, “all humans are 
composed of more than flesh and bone -- even those who, because of unlawful and deviant 
behavior, must be locked away not only from their fellow citizens, but from other inmates as 
well.”225 The opinion outlined events that buttressed the legal conclusion that severe 
Constitutional violations had occurred and were likely to continue to occur at Pelican Bay.226 
Judge Henderson continually juxtaposed the overarching theme of shared common humanity and 
individual Constitutional rights with the regimen of pain and deprivation in the SHU to 
underscore the seriousness of the issue.227 The court distinguished the use of force in this case 
from “normal disciplinary channels” which defendants were entitled to use in administering the 
prison.228 Plaintiff’s experts testified that punishment at Pelican Bay was: “repugnant and 
humiliating,” “a ritual of inflicting punishment,” “grossly excessive, utterly unbelievable, and 
without parallel in present-day American corrections.”229 The constant reminder of a common 
human bond deepened and humanized the factual scenarios that included tales of beatings and 
other physical abuse by guards that rose to the level of torture and motivated solely by the desire 
for revenge or retaliation,230 willful deprivations of Constitutionally mandated medical231 and 
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mental health care,232 routine and systematic use of maximum rather than minimum force in 
everyday situations,233 a “code of silence” that pervaded the internal prison culture,234 and a blind 
eye to all of these problems by prison administrators, wardens, and those within the CDC who 
were mandated to undertake internal investigations into such violations.235 
According to Judge Henderson, the defendants, after lengthy litigation, had yet to 
acknowledge there was a problem within the prison, and worse had shown no tendency to 
attempt to remedy any of the Constitutional violations described at trial.236 Because of these facts 
and because of a previous pattern of “delay and obstruction”237 by state prison officials, Judge 
Henderson appointed a special master to oversee institutional reform and to work with plaintiffs 
and defendants to devise a remedial plan.238 By employing a special master, extending the 
remedial stage of the litigation, and expanding the scope of federal court intrusion, Judge 
Henderson attempted further reform of CDC management just as federal judges in the 1970s in 
Constitutionalized state prison systems in Arkansas, Alabama, and Texas.239 
C.   Internal Results of Judicial Intervention 
The special master appointed by Judge Henderson in 1995 issued a final report in the 
spring of 2004.240 The special master concluded that after nine years of Court monitoring and 
supervision, repeated special inquiries, and federal prosecutions of prison employees by the 
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Department of Justice that “fundamental changes in leadership, operations, and attitudes are 
necessary before the [CDC] achieves compliance with the Court’s use of force remedial 
orders.”241 The special master recommended further court oversight and intervention to be sure 
that the defendants continue to move towards compliance with the remedial plan.242 The special 
master found undisputed evidence of continued violations of court orders and noted the 
intransigence of CDC officials who “characterize their misconduct as gross incompetence and 
negligence rather than deliberate actions.”243 
The problems at Pelican Bay remain largely unabated, but by far the most serious 
concern for both the court and the special master is the “code of silence” within the department 
facilitated by the growth in external political and internal administrative power of the CCPOA.244 
Increased power of the CCPOA is well documented245 as is the inability of CDC officials to 
discipline prison guards for excessive force complaints and other Constitutional violations.246 
Finally, the special master concluded that the problems at Pelican Bay “exist at other CDC 
prisons” and “emanate from the CDC’s Central Office in Sacramento, which serves all 
prisons.”247 Continued gross contraventions of the Eighth Amendment at California prison 
institutions other than Pelican Bay illustrate both the dichotomy between problems of penal 
administration and the goals of effective punishment and the lack of serious reform.248 
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D.  External Results of Judicial Intervention  
Although the CDC as an institution remains resistant to serious reform, making progress 
only in fits and starts,249 federal court intervention has substantially changed conditions within 
Pelican Bay Prison250 and has brought the issue of prison reform to the forefront of state 
politics.251 Pelican Bay is an entirely different prison today from the one Judge Henderson toured 
in 1994.252 The transformation of Pelican Bay from a prison where gross abuse of prisoners was 
routine to one where prison officials honor Constitutional rights was only the first step in altering 
the way the CDC operates.253 Judge Henderson’s decision and ongoing oversight substantially 
transformed Pelican Bay itself into a prison where the staff takes pride in their level of 
professionalism.254 It is no longer necessary for the federal court to exercise tight oversight and 
control of day-to-day operations because of the fundamental changes in prison operations.255 
However, the problems that do remain cannot be solved at the level of prison operations but are 
indicative of larger problems that permeate the CDC.256 
In 2004, after the recall election of then Governor Gray Davis, state politicians began to 
pay serious attention to the systemic problems within the CDC. Governor Schwarzenegger and 
State Senators Gloria Romero and Jackie Speier began to work seriously on transforming the 
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way California’s prisons are run.257 The newly elected Governor appointed former guard Rod 
Hickman as the Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) and Jeanne 
Woodford, former warden of San Quentin and known as a strong advocate for prisoner 
rehabilitation, as the new director of the CDC.258 Both appear committed to substantial reform 
but face serious obstacles, including entrenched bureaucracy, the undue influence of the 
CCPOA, a culture of silence and cover-up surrounding allegations of prison guard misconduct 
coupled with bureaucratic resistance to change.259 The slow pace of reform, coupled with 
formidable structural obstacles, led Judge Henderson to threaten a federal court takeover of the 
CDC midway through 2004.260 
While ongoing crisis within the CDC marked 2004, the year also presented an 
opportunity for nascent reform. The California State Senate held special committee hearings.261 
Legislators introduced twenty-eight prison reform related bills, and Governor Schwarzenegger 
signed seventeen of those bills, including some opposed by the CCPOA.262 The Governor 
appointed the Deukmejian Commission to investigate and recommend systemic reforms.263 The 
executive branch began to implement reforms including a restructuring of YACA and the 
creation of an Independent Bureau of Review264 to investigate allegations of correctional officer 
wrongdoing outside of the CCPOA’s sphere of influence and corruption.265 
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Unfortunately, some improvements have already begun to deteriorate in 2005 due to the 
slow pace of change and the continued opposition of the CCPOA.266 The plan to reorganize and 
rename YACA,267 creating a Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is set to be approved 
by the California Legislature but observers question whether centralizing control of the system 
will prove to an adequate solution.268 The plan makes wardens accountable to the executive 
branch and attempts to insulate prison management from political pressures including CCPOA 
influence.269 State Senator Romero believes that reorganization of this nature “won’t stop the 
scandals” but gives “this governor credit for having the internal fortitude to deal with prison 
reform.”270 Further, the advocacy of victim’s rights groups funded by the CCPOA has stymied 
other reforms scheduled to take place including alternative sanctions for parole violators.271 
Sustained political attention to the problems in California’s prison system requires 
political courage.  Whether California politicians are able to continue the recent nascent shift 
toward rehabilitation and humane prison conditions remains to be seen.  Regardless, federal 
courts will continue to exercise oversight and monitoring to ensure Constitutional conditions of 
confinement in the areas of prison overcrowding,272 excessive force complaints,273 medical274 
and mental health care,275 and parolee procedural due process rights. 276 Although federal court 
intervention may not have directly caused recent political attempts at reform; the publicity 
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generated by federal court action and subsequent exposure of systemic abuses contributed to 
steps by both the California legislative and executive branches to attempt a transformation of the 
CDC bureaucracy. The state is finally acting – albeit ten years after serious federal judicial 
intervention began.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The shift from modern penal systems, which focused on individual rehabilitation and 
preparation for re-integration into general society, to a neo-classical mode in which state power 
accumulates at the expense of the individual, has resulted in a “reflexivity of the penal system” 
where the power of both prison industries and corrections employees grows as prison 
populations increase.277 Increased prison power is then further reinforced by heightened 
prosecutions for what were previously minor offenses and by the tendency of parole and 
probation officers to return parolees to prison for technical violations.278 
Although lawyers and public interest law groups have undertaken structural prison 
reform litigation since the 1960s, there has been a resurgence of claims of prisoner abuse over 
the last decade as the systematic use of excessive force, punishment, and retaliation by prison 
guards to control prisoners becomes more widespread.279 If prisons map the “social body,” this 
diachronic trend away from rehabilitation and back toward physical discipline and punishment 
threatens the legal and social order.280 Increased government control and abuse of prisoners 
leads to increased government control and abuse of individuals outside prison walls.281 
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Torture was classically condoned by the state as the regulated production of pain in a 
ritualized setting,282 but at Pelican Bay, physical violence by guards against inmates was 
prevalent and systematic, used by prison guards and administrators to establish their power rather 
than for any legitimate penological purpose.283 Judge Henderson sought to bring the prison, and 
eventually the CDC, back into line with accepted penal practices and within the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of civilized society.   
The prisoner-guard conflict at Pelican Bay mirrors the ongoing tension between state 
power and individual rights while illustrating the problem of excessive power in closed 
institutions:  “there must be a principle of moderation for the power of punishment” lest 
unrestrained state power filter into the rest of the social order.284 Legal texts and judicial 
intervention, rather than the political process, may be the only effective ways to mediate the 
power of prison officials with the rights of prisoners, especially when felons are shut out of the 
political process through disfranchisement and political pragmatism; it is the rare elected official 
who can take up the mantle of prison reform without judicial prodding.285 In the words of Justice 
William Brennan:   
Those who we would banish from society  
or from human community itself often speak  
in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s  
demand for punishment.  It is the particular role 
of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution  
declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone  
dictate the conditions of social life.286 
282 Id. at 33,39 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (characterizing the goals of torture as 
crime deterrence or confession). 
283 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
284 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 90. 
285 FEELEY, supra note 23, at 66-79 (noting that Arkansas officials were caught in a cycle of prison scandals and 
were only able to turn the corner after federal judicial intervention gave them and excuse to act).  Of course in other 
states elected officials were reluctant to undertake any reform and deeply resented judicial intervention.  Id. at 80-85 
(describing the history of Texas’ experience with prison reform). 
286 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (Brennan, J. in dissent). 
38
Federal judges, in the context of structural prison reform litigation, have compelled 
remedies of Constitutional deficiencies and the enforcement of individual Constitutional rights 
when the political process has failed.287 The recent California experience shows that intervention 
in state institutions by federal courts is justified to protect the Constitutional rights of those shut 
out of the political process.288 Prisoners are one such class.  
Without the publicity generated by the Pelican Bay Prison case, it is likely that 
Constitutional violations of prisoner civil rights by California prison guards and administrators 
would have continued.289 Judge Henderson’s actions, culminating in a threatened takeover of 
California’s prisons, resulted in real steps toward reform by California’s legislative and 
executive branches.290 However, whether such reforms are implemented remains to be seen.   
The Pelican Bay case illustrates a national ambivalence toward federal judicial power.  
The tension between the tenets of democratic elections and the dictates of the Constitution is 
exemplified by Judge Henderson’s actions.  Continued critiques of activist federal judges may 
lead to fewer judges willing to endure such criticism and take the steps required to remedy 
violations of our individual Constitutional rights.  Judicial independence continues to be 
threatened – California’s prisons demonstrate why such independence is necessary. 
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